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Abstract
The failure of assets is an important strategic issue for organizations. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a 
commonly used tool for analysing potential failures and predicting their effect on the system. However, FMEA 
viewed from the perspective of corporate governance, lacks transparency, repeatability and the ability to 
continuously improve the existing analysis. In this paper a method is proposed to express the probability of the 
failure of assets as a function of explanatory variables, such as age, utilization, operating environment, maturity of 
maintenance processes, education level of maintenance personnel or the number of safety violations. This method is 
based on the way financial economists model the probability of failure of firms. A ranked list of risk is produced that 
is based upon the probability of failure of an asset combined with the loss associated with failure. The output of the 
method can be used to support the traditional FMEA analysis as an early warning model by quantitatively predicting 
the economic loss of failure of an asset. The main theoretical contribution of the paper relates to the application of 
logit modelling for evaluating risks associated with the failure of physical assets. The method will be demonstrated 
and evaluated through a case study on the failure of nuclear power plants and is based upon explanatory variables 
which were available in practice.
Keywords: Asset management, reliability, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
1.  Introduction
The failure of physical assets can have many consequences ranging from a loss in productivity to 
the loss of lives or environmental disasters. Such failures can have a strategic impact on the firm. 
It is important to be able to predict the probability and impact of the failure of physical assets so 
that management can mitigate risks [1]. In the nuclear power industry the failure of (a part) of an 
asset can be disastrous; the Chernobyl accident in 1986 showed the consequences of such a 
failure [2]. It is desirable to have early warning signals that identify when the probabilities of 
asset failures are changing. One of the most established maintenance methods today is 
reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) which originates from the defence and airline industries. 
RCM is a maintenance approach in which maintenance objectives are defined from a 
user-oriented perspective [1].
An important element of RCM methodology is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
analysis. “FMEA is a method of reliability analysis intended to identify failures, which have 
consequences affecting the functioning of a system within the limits of a given application, thus 
enabling priorities for action to be set” [3]. Three factors are taken into account when evaluating 
failure: the severity; the probability of occurrence; and the likelihood of detecting the failure [4].
Failure modes are the possible ways, or modes, in which an asset can fail. Failure may be 
interpreted as either functional failure or system failure [1]. Effects analysis involves predicting 
the effects of each failure mode. Although FMEA is widely accepted and used, there are some 
weak points, for example its inability to determine failure cost [5].
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A known alternative to the FMEA is the Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), in which a so-called ‘criticality matrix’ is used [6]. It provides a means of identifying 
and comparing the failure modes with respect to severity. The matrix is constructed by inserting 
item or failure mode identification numbers in matrix locations representing the severity 
classification category and either the probability of occurrence level or the criticality number (Cr) 
for each item’s failure modes. The resulting matrix shows the distribution of criticality of item 
failure modes and provides a tool for assigning corrective action priorities [6]. The technique has 
some advantages over the traditional Risk Priority Number (RPN), used is the FMEA: (1) the 
probability of failure frequency is measured; (2) the detection index is eliminated, which avoids 
the problem of assigning weightings; and (3) ordinal measures are not multiplied [7].
Companies are more and more considered as ‘social institutions’ with responsibilities and 
accountability, not just to shareholders but to employees and the wider community in general [8].
Irresponsible behaviour such as deliberate risk taking to reduce maintenance costs can have 
undesired results for the stakeholders of a firm. An example is the case of Railtrack in the United 
Kingdom where ineffective maintenance planning led to the failure of some track, causing two 
train crashes which eventually led to the complete demise of the company [9].
The FMEA method requires the severity, probability of occurrence and the likelihood of 
detecting failure to be estimated by a group of experts. These are qualitative judgments. This 
makes the analysis subjective which impacts upon the reliability and repeatability of the data and 
the analysis. Teoh [10 p.280] stated: “when the FMEA grows, the information will be 
increasingly difficult to find. Eventually users will prefer to recreate their own FMEA rather than 
reuse existing knowledge with a risk of repeated failures''. Because all experts have to be 
consulted again the process can become time consuming and costly. There is also no guarantee
that the new assessment will be an improvement. 
In line with the observations of Teoh [10], during industrial projects carried out by the current 
authors anecdotal evidence suggested that FMEA is almost always used for the initial design of 
maintenance policies, but that there are often no clear policies or procedures for maintaining the 
FMEA because of the difficulties associated with updating the FMEA. In practice, maintenance 
plans appear to be changed often without the use of the existing FMEA analysis. The FMEA 
analysis can therefore become outdated. Some failure modes may receive insufficient attention, 
whilst others may be neglected. This can lead to unplanned risk taking and unnecessary costs.
To overcome the limitations of FMEA, the analysis of the failure of assets requires a new 
approach that is more quantitative and that is easier to reproduce and reuse in the future. Failure 
has been an important area of research for financial economists since the late 1960s [11, 12].
Financial economists model the probability of financial failure of firms, primarily banks and 
insurance companies, by using a range of statistical and intelligent techniques that are 
reproducible and can be reused in the future. In the early years they used financial ratios, then 
discriminant analysis, and more recently neural networks [12]. The probability of failure, the 
chance that a firm will go bankrupt, together with the loss associated with a given failure is used 
to determine which firms have the highest risk. 
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The aim of this paper is to develop an early warning system for asset or plant failures based on 
historic part/asset or plant data. Objective (A): is to develop a model which uses quantitative 
measures, is maintainable and can be used to support an existing FMEA or Failure Modes Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to evaluate the risks asset failure. Objective (B): is to 
demonstrate the possible application of our model and objective (C) is to compare the results of 
the model with previous results of FMEA and FMECA analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses upon FMEA and other 
approaches that have been used to model the failure of assets. Section 3 outlines an approach 
used by financial economists to model failure of a firm. This approach is used to develop a model 
that is used to develop a risk analysis tool that is applied to the failure of assets. This formulation 
and development of the tool is described in section 4. Section 5 and 6 illustrate the practical 
application of the tool based on real-world data. This is followed by the conclusions that 
summarise the major contributions of the paper.
2.  Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Failure Mode & Effects Analysis was developed in 1949 by the American Army to evaluate the 
impact of system and equipment failures on mission success, and the safety of personnel and 
equipment [10]. Stamatis [13] identified four forms of FMEA: (1) system FMEA or concept 
FMEA, which focuses upon potential failure modes caused by interactions between functions or 
deficiencies; (2) design FMEA, for the identification of failures associated with products, 
machines or tooling; (3) process FMEA, used to analyze manufacturing and assembly processes 
focusing upon failure modes associated with tasks, errors or mistakes arising from system or 
process deficiencies; and (4) service FMEA, used to analyze services before they reach the 
customer, which focuses on failure modes associated with service tasks, errors and mistakes.
The FMEA process has been adapted for use in many international standardized quality systems 
including IEC60812 (Analysis Techniques for System Reliability), QS9000 (a set of quality 
standards for the automotive industry; ISO 9001 with some additional requirements specific to 
the automotive industry) and ISO/TS 16949 (a quality standard which applies to the 
design/development, production and installation and servicing of automotive-related products). 
The IEC60812 standard issued by the International Electrotechnical Commission describes 
FMEA and FMECA and gives guidance on the application of FMEA and FMECA. QS9000, in 
which the FMEA analysis is incorporated, is the American Auto Industry Quality System 
Standard that embraces ISO9000 with emphasis on customer satisfaction. 
FMEA is used to identify failure modes. Failure modes are the ways, or modes, in which an asset 
can fail. The severity of failure is rated, typically using ten levels ranging from almost 
unnoticeable (level 1) through to life threatening failure (level 10). The approximate probabilities 
of failure are estimated, again using ten levels ranging from level 1 (extremely remote) through to 
level 10 (extremely high probability of occurrence). The likelihood of the failure being detected 
is similarly assessed using a ten point scale. It is usual practice to combine these ratings into a 
risk priority number [4].
.= DOSRPN !! (1)
Where S = severity; O = probability of asset failure;  and D = detection
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Kmenta and Ishii [7] considered three disadvantages of the RPN . Firstly, it is a based on 
qualitative data that measures the relative significance of various failures. Secondly, it provides 
no financial evaluation of the impact of failures. This makes it very difficult to optimize 
maintenance planning decisions based on cost-effectiveness. Nowadays companies need to make 
cost-driven decisions that consider the risk of failure, the costs of failure and prevention strategies 
and costs. This is especially important for decisions relating to the integrity of assets; these are of 
primary concern in hazardous capital intensive industries such as the oil and gas sectors. Even a 
small incident can have catastrophic impact. Thirdly, there are some problems with the definition 
of D (Detection). It is unclear whether D is intended to measure how easy it is to detect 
whether a failure has occurred or the timing of its occurrence. Another interpretation is that D
aims to measure how easy or difficult it is to prevent failures [5]. A further shortcoming of 
the RPN calculation is that the elements are not necessarily equally weighted which can lead to 
misleading results [14, 15].
In a traditional FMEA, the probability of failure occurrence is usually estimated using data 
provided by suppliers. This is normally in the form of estimates of failure rate or the mean time 
between failures ( MTBF ), which is the reciprocal of failure rate (in time).
,=
timeoperating
failuresofnumber
ratefailure (2)
.=
failuresofnumber
hoursoperating
MTBF (3)
This data, together with the judgement of experts, is used to estimate the probability of failure. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the probability of failure is partly determined in a 
qualitative way, which can make it difficult to reuse, reproduce or improve the results of the 
analysis.
Rhee and Ishii [5] reviewed the traditional FMEA approach and concluded that: i) failure cost 
should be determined; ii) a sensitivity analysis should be carried out; and iii) the lack of clarity 
associated with detection should be addressed. Recent FMEA research [5, 7, 10, 14, 15] has been 
focused upon addressing the limitations of FMEA, by: (1) using different measurement schemes 
that consider multiple failure scenarios and incorporate sensitivity analysis; (2) taking costs into 
consideration; and (3) connecting the FMEA with functional diagrams which is used to represent 
the conceptual design.
Franceschini and Galetto [14] introduced a model Risk Priority Code (RPC) which is capable of 
handling different importance levels for the three failure mode component indexes in 
RPN importance attached to a particular index. For example, lowering the importance of the 
D (Detection) index decreases its influence on the selected failure mode.
Kmenta and Ishii [7] developed the scenario-based FMEA, which translates risks into costs and 
makes cost-based decisions possible. The scenario-based FMEA is dependent on cost and 
probability estimates. Teoh and Case [10] developed the FMAG (Failure Modes and effects 
Analysis Generation method) which uses a knowledge based approach connecting the FMEA 
with functional diagrams aimed at improving the repeatability of the analysis. FMAG is based on 
the ‘knowledge fragment’ approach, cited in [10]. Previous failure reports are knowledge 
fragments that reflect reasoning and experience of experts. Each knowledge fragment by itself 
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does not contribute much; Teoh and Case [10] show that together they can be organized to 
provide meaningful knowledge. The subjective assumptions and methods associated with FMEA 
makes it difficult for a board of directors to be transparent and take responsibility for decisions 
impacting the failure of assets.
3.  Financial Failure of Firms
From the perspective of corporate governance the financial failure of firms are to a large extent 
comparable with the physical failure of technical assets. Governance practices are designed in 
both cases to decrease the probability of failure and to mitigate the (highest) risk. From the late 
1960s the financial failure of firms e.g. banks has been studied extensively. Financial failure is
defined here as a financial loss for a range of stakeholders. Altman [11] was one of the first to 
study this popular topic. Kumar and Ravi [12] presented a comprehensive review of research 
conducted between 1968 and 2005. Wilson and Sharda [16] highlighted the importance of the 
financial failure to all stakeholders including shareholders, creditors, employees and customers. 
Many studies have focused upon constructing early warning systems that express the probability 
of future failure as a function of variables from the current period (see for example Martin [17]).
The default risk for a bank is defined as the likelihood that a loan will not be repaid and will fall 
into default [18]. Interest in this area has risen since the introduction of a new capital adequacy 
framework known as Basel II [19] and has recently received even more attention. The probability 
of default is one of the inputs used for determining the capital reserve requirements for a bank. 
Another input is the so-called ‘loss given default’ (the loss that arises when failure occurs). Loss 
given default reflects the bad debt faced by the bank when the event of failure actually occurs. 
The probability of failure multiplied by the loss given default yields the expected loss. 
Comparing the expected losses of all loans would allow priority setting in mitigating the (highest) 
risk.
4.  Modelling the Probability of the Failure of Assets
In this section the approach outlined in the previous section is applied to the failure of physical 
assets. The starting point is the risk priority number (RPN), which was defined in equation (1). 
FMEA is considered from a probabilistic perspective (as in FMECA). A probabilistic method 
leverages statistical theory and data analysis and, thus, can establish more accurate links between 
records with more complex errors and error patterns than deterministic systems. It is assumed 
that all failures are detected, which avoids the problems associated with the interpretation and 
measurement of the term as is also done with the FMECA analysis. In standard FMEA the RPN
has to be determined for each asset. A natural assumption for a function G which translates 
"X into a number between 0 and 1 is a distribution function, or the cumulative density. Binary 
response models can be defined in this way.
Let n be the total number of assets. nFF ,,1 ! denotes binary variables that indicate whether or 
not each asset has failed ( 1=iF if asset i failed during the period and 0=iF otherwise). 
Failure is deemed to have occurred when an asset (or part of an asset) is out of order and this 
causes an economic loss. The severity component within the calculation of the RPN is 
measured in terms of economic loss. Please note that this approach ignores failures that do not 
result in a loss. The probability of failure is used as the occurrence term O in equation (1). The 
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probability of failure as a function of variables is shown in equation (2).
),;(=)|1=( "iii XGXFprob (2)
)|1=( ii XFprob is the probability that asset i failed, given a vector of explanatory variables 
iX . iX contains values for the explanatory variables associate with the asset, for example age 
of the asset and time it has been used. The vector can also contain information about the 
environment, for example the operating temperature. The probability of failure is modelled as a 
function )(#G of the explanatory variables. " is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Equation (2) is a linear probability model. Because the derivative of the probability in a simple 
linear probability model with respect to X is merely " , nothing constrains the predicted value 
between (0, 1).
Just as with a multiple regression, a logistic regression predicts a metric dependent variable. In
this case probability values are constrained to the range between 0 and 1. The logistic 
transformation accomplishes this in two steps [20]. First by restating a probability as odds. Any 
odds value can be converted back into a probability that falls between 0 and 1. The odds variable 
solves the first task of making probability estimates between 0 and 1. In addition, the odds value
is to be kept from going below 0, which is the lower limit of the odds. The solution is to compute 
what is termed the logit value calculated by taking the logarithm of the odds. Odds less than 1.0 
will have a negative logit value, odds ratios greater than 1.0 will have positive logit values and 
the odds ratio of 1.0 (corresponding to a probability of .5) has a logit value of 0. Moreover, 
independent of how low the negative value gets, it can still be transformed by taking the antilog 
into an odds value greater than 0.
Choosing G to be the logistic distribution yields the possibility of using the logit model of 
Johnston and DiNardo [21]. Equation (2) can therefore be rewritten as:
,
)(exp1
1
=)(=);(
i
ii
X
XXG
"
""
$%&
$'
(3)
The standard normal transformation )(#( constraints the probability to lie between 0 and 1, or
1)(lim )(
&*+
z
z
and 0)(lim )(
%*+
z
z
One of the advantages of the logit is that the parameters can be easily estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method. Multiple regression employs the method of least squares, which 
minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the actual and predicted values of the 
dependent variable. The nonlinear nature of the logistic transformation requires that another 
procedure, the maximum likelihood procedure, be used in an iterative manner to find the most 
likely estimates for the coefficients. Instead of minimizing the squared deviations (least squares), 
logistic regression maximizes the likelihood that an event will occur. The likelihood value instead 
of the sum of squares is then used when calculating a measure of overall model fit. 
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Figure 1. Example form of the logistic relationship between dependent and independent variables
Logit modelling has not only been used for predicting the failure of firms but also for historic and 
political research, for example to predict the chance that a political candidate wins an election 
[22] or in historic research to examine trade’s effect on conflict [23].
5.  Application
First the approach assumes n independent and identical assets. So to apply the approach we 
must focus on a number of similar assets; for example, several locations where the same 
comparable asset is used. Next it is necessary to set a timeframe for the analysis. The approach of 
section 4 determined the probability of failure as a function of characteristics of the asset. It is 
therefore necessary to predict the variables which are likely to be highly correlated with asset 
failure (modes). In the previous the variable ‘age’ was identified as a possible explanatory 
variable that could be correlated with asset failure. 
When failure of the asset is caused by physical failure, it can be considered to be due to the 
degraded physical condition of an asset [1]. Degradation can lead to performance loss, loss in 
production, safety hazards and possible further physical degradation of the asset. A serious 
physical degradation of an asset or installation can be measured as a binary variable stating 
whether or not an asset has been in a state of serious physical degradation during a period.
The failure of the asset can also be caused by people. Slack et al [24] classifies ‘people failure’
into two categories; (non-deliberate) errors and violations. Non-deliberate errors include misuse 
of assets by operators as well as faulty maintenance schedules and maintenance backlog. An 
operator misuse variable can for example be defined as: 
.=_
periodainuseoftimesofnumbertotal
periodaduringmisuseoftimesofnumber
misuseoperator
(6)
Faulty maintenance schedules can be translated into a variable which states how often corrective 
maintenance is performed more then was estimated for the defined period. Maintenance backlog 
can be thought of as a variable which states whether or not a planned maintenance is postponed 
or cancelled during a certain period.
In the proposed approach various explanatory variables that might explain the failure of assets are 
proposed. These variables need to be analysed to establish whether they are correlated with asset 
failure. The approach taken here is to first model asset failure using a small number of significant 
 8
variables. The accuracy of the model can then be improved by additional explanatory variables.
In order to estimate the probability of failure, data on the explanatory variables need to be 
collected for a time period for each (type of) asset. Information on which assets failed, when and 
why it failed is also required. This data can be used to estimate the logit model. This will result in 
an estimated probability for each asset. Also information on the cost of failure needs to be 
collected.
To summarize the above, the approach consists of determining two inputs, the probability of 
failure and the cost when failure occurs. The following steps need to be performed: 
1.  Select n equal assets; 
2.  Set the time frame; 
3.  Collect data on the variables; 
4.  Determine the logit model and the probability of failure;
5.  Determine costs associated with the different consequences of failure; 
6.  Determine probability of each consequence. 
Using the two inputs, the expected cost of failure for each asset can be determined. When the 
assets are set in order from the largest to the lowest expected cost, a ranking of assets in terms of 
risk is produced. This ranking provides a simple tool that will help focus the attention of 
managers enabling them to prioritise the use of maintenance resources.
6. Demonstration of the logit model on failure of US nuclear power plants
As this is a novel approach for analysing the failure of assets, we will demonstrate the use of the 
logit model for clarification. Consider a situation where 104 comparable assets (e.g. nuclear 
power plants) have been observed for failure over a certain period. In this demonstration the age 
of the asset is taken as the explanatory variable and is measured as the mean age during the 
measurement period of two years (2000-2001). Braverman, Miller et al [25] and Nie, Braverman 
and Hofmayer [26] collected and reviewed degradation occurrences in US nuclear power plants 
and identified important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations during 
a nine year period. In their review they already showed a relationship between degradation 
occurrences (failures) and the age of Nuclear Power Plants. The dataset consists of failure data of 
all 104 operating nuclear power plants in the US. The use of the dataset shows that 61 out of 104 
nuclear power plants failed during the sample period of two year (2000-2001). Failure is in this 
dataset as failure of safety-related structures and passive components as a result of aging-related 
degradation occurrences [26].
To compute the plant age when a particular degradation event occurred, the date that the 
construction permit (CP) was issued was selected as the starting time of the plants. 
The assets which failed had a mean age of 31 and the assets that did not fail had a mean age of 29. 
This appears to indicate that age is positively related to the probability of failure. Or stated 
differently, when the age of an asset at the beginning of a period is higher, the probability of 
failure during the period will be higher. When we estimate a logit model based on this data we 
find ,,
-
.
//
0
1%
1.6
0.6
=" , so the model for the probability of failure now is 
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.
)1.6(6.0exp1
1
=1)=(
age
Fprob i !%&
(7)
In this example, age has a positive effect on the probability of failure. The model can now be 
used to estimate the probability of failure for each asset. The third row of the table shows the 
estimated probabilities. For the first asset we find a probability of 
0.14=
25)1.6(6.0exp1
1
=1)=( 1 !%&
Fprob and for the last asset with the highest age the 
probability is 0.41=
34)1.6(6.0exp1
1
=1)=( 12 !%&
Fprob . So indeed the probability is higher 
when the age of the asset is higher. The statistical significance of the findings naturally depends 
on the available data, i.e. the measurement period or number of assets included.
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 26 27 28 29 34
1)=(Fprob
0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.41 
Table 1. Example of calculated probabilities of failure in two years (2000-2001)
Example of an observation: if we choose 2001-2007 as measurement period, the probability of
asset failure varies between 0.52 for the youngest (average 29 years) plant and 0.93 for the oldest 
plant (average 43 years). Note that the starting and ending years (1999 and 2008) were omitted 
because of incomplete measurements (not full measurement year).
When we use Poisson regression (assuming that the response variable Y has a Poisson 
distribution, and that the logarithm of its expected value can be modelled by a linear combination 
of unknown parameters [27]), we can obtain the number of failures predicted. In the simplest case 
with a single independent variable x, the model takes the form: 
bxaYE ))))(log( (8)
For the period (2001 to 2007) we can see that for the youngest assets (29 years) 1.46 failures are 
predicted and for the oldest (43 years) 3.08 failures are predicted in a seven year period.
Out of interest, we also performed a more advanced time-series logit analysis to see if earlier 
failures are influencing subsequent failures of the same plant. This analysis showed insignificant 
results.
Calculating costs
An appropriate way to evaluate risk is in terms of the probability and cost of loss arising from 
failure. The loss associated with failure depends upon the consequences of failure which are 
quantified in cost. Depending on the method used, categories can be (1) Safety and 
environmental consequences, (2) Operational consequences and (3) Non-operational 
consequences [1].
Notation: Let ijf be the probability that consequence j occurs when asset i fails and let ijC
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be the associated cost.  Consider n equal and independent assets and assume ijf and ijC to 
be constant over i , the probability of failure is determined for every asset, the index i can be 
omitted from the notation. So jf is the probability that consequence j occurs and jC are the 
cost of this consequence. The expected costs of failure for asset i can be determined as
.=
4
1=
jj
j
ii CfPEC #2
(9)
The total expected cost of failure (TEC ) for all the n assets can now be calculated as follows :
ii
n
i
ECPTEC #2
1=
=
(10)
.=
1=
4
1=
i
n
i
jj
j
PCf 22 ##
Finally the assets can be ranked based on iEC to determine which asset has the highest 
(economic) risk. In order to be able to calculate the cost of the failure of nuclear assets we would 
need to collect data on the average consequences of the studied asset failure types.
6. Evaluation
To evaluate the proposed method we have to compare it with the existing RPN used in FMEA 
analyses. For our comparison we focus on the identified weaknesses of the existing RPN method;
the quality of the outcome, the repeatability of the method and transparency of the results. Our 
findings are that (1) the outcomes can improve or verify an existing FMEA analysis and 
subsequent maintenance planning but the outcomes are ultimately depending on the quality of the 
available data used. (2) The quantitative nature of the model makes it easier to repeat than a
qualitative judgement of experts, continuous improvement is therefore easier to achieve. (3) The 
quantitative nature of the results makes it easier for a board of directors to be transparent to 
stakeholders about asset performance and the mitigation of risks.
The proposed method can however not be seen as an integral replacement of the existing RPN
method. Our method is an extension of the original RPN. The proposed approach should be 
integrated with currently available FMEA models. A potential disadvantage of the model is that 
the data needed may not be readily available within firms.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to develop an early warning system for asset or plant failures based on 
historic part/asset or plant data. 
The first objective is to develop a model which uses quantitative measures, is maintainable and 
can be used to support an existing FMEA or Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) to evaluate the risks asset failure. Many firms have used FMEA, a tool to determine 
the failure modes and the effects of these modes. The subjective assumptions and methods 
associated with FMEA make it difficult for a board of directors to be transparent and take 
responsibility for decisions impacting the failure of assets. The proposed logit modeling is an 
approach that can statistically predict failure of assets as a function of explanatory variables. The
method is based on the way financial economists model the probability of failure of firms.
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The estimated probability of failure combined with the expected cost can be used to list the assets 
from the one with highest risk to the one with lowest risk. This list can be used besides the output 
of the RPN in the traditional FMEA analysis. 
The second objective, is the demonstration of the proposed model with actual failure data of US 
nuclear power plants. Based on available data we show that it is possible to predict asset failure 
by using existing asset failure data and age as the explaining variable.
Our last objective was to evaluate the model and compare the results of the model with previous 
results of FMEA and FMECA analyses. This was done in section 6. The proposed model has 
several important advantages, yet has as potential disadvantage that the results will be no better 
than the quality of the input data. This, however, may also be seen as an incentive: it may 
motivate firms to start collecting relevant and high-quality data. 
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